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C.A. V. WILLIAM S. HART UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT: CALIFORNIA’S SHIFT IN
VICARIOUS LIABILITY LEAVES SCHOOL
DISTRICTS WITH NO PROTECTION
Catherine Blumenfeld*
I. INTRODUCTION
Roselyn Hubbell was the head guidance counselor at Golden
Valley High School until police arrested her when she checked into a
motel with an underage male student.1 Following this incident, a
second student, C.A., sued Hubbell and the William S. Hart Union
High School District (“the District”) claiming that both the
individual and the public entity were responsible for the sexual abuse
to which Hubbell had subjected him.2 C.A.’s allegations eventually
led to the C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District
(“William S. Hart”)3 lawsuit. Even more disturbing than the sexual
abuse details that C.A. revealed to the court4 were C.A.’s allegations
that the District had known that “Hubbell had engaged in unlawful
sexually-related conduct with minors in the past.”5
The California Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in William
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. English, Indiana
University, Bloomington. I sincerely thank Paul T. Hayden for his academic and legal guidance.
Even more appreciation is due to my loving and supportive parents, Andrew and Jeanne
Blumenfeld, who have made my education possible.
1. Sharon Cotal & Jim Holt, Ex-Counselor Arrested, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL
(Aug. 15, 2008, 5:03 AM), http://www.signalscv.com/archives/2356/.
2. Brian Charles, Hubbell Learns Her Fate, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL
(Apr. 11, 2009, 4:55 AM), http://www.signalscv.com/archives/11819/.
3. 270 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2012).
4. Appellant accused Hubbell of, among other things, forcing him to have sexual
intercourse; “kissing him on his lips, face, chest, penis, testicles and other areas; masturbating
him; and performing fellatio on him.” Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe at *5–6, C.A. v.
William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. B217982)
2009 CA App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 6336. C.A. was referred to as John AC Doe in earlier litigation
against Hubbell and the District. Both names refer to the same individual. See C.A. v. William S.
Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 283 (Ct. App. 2010).
5. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702.
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S. Hart established a new standard of vicarious liability for public
school districts whose administrative and supervisory employees
knew or should have known of an employee’s propensity for sexual
misconduct and, yet, hired and inadequately supervised the
employee.6 The court remanded C.A.’s case to the court of appeal to
determine whether this standard applied to the William S. Hart
Union School District.7
The court’s decision in William S. Hart may seem fair in light of
recent reports of sexual harassment and abuse committed by school
employees against students.8 However, this Comment argues that the
holding improperly increases the standard of care school districts
owe to their students. School districts have long been exempt from
the role of “insurers of the physical safety of [their] students,”9 but
William S. Hart changes that. Now, public school districts must more
vigilantly police interactions between students and teachers to ensure
that the districts do not violate the court’s vague “knew or should
have known” standard of care.
Part II of this Comment recounts the facts of William S. Hart.
Part III details the court of appeal’s decision in favor of the District
and examines the unanimous California Supreme Court decision,
which overturned the court of appeal and other case precedent. Part
IV analyzes the shift in the California Supreme Court’s approach to
vicarious liability for public school districts from the prior leading
case of John R. v. Oakland Unified School District.10 This part
argues that, while students should be protected, the court’s new
approach to vicarious liability goes too far. An assessment of the
California media’s focus on sexual harassment and abuse by
educators supports this position. The enhanced attention the media
6. Id. at 711.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Barbara Jones, Sex Scandal, Cover-Up Claims at LAUSD: Former
Superintendent Ramon Cortines’ Accuser Speaks Out, DAILY NEWS L.A. (Aug. 25, 2012,
6:40 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/ci_21401483/sex-scandal-cover-up-claims-at-lausd-former;
Dave Marquis, Sac. Unified Employee Reinstated After Sex Harassment Probe, ABC NEWS 10
(Sept. 20, 2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/article/210422/2/School-employee
-reinstated-after-sex-harassment-investigation; Principal Accused of Sexual Harassment Takes
Leave, NEWS 10 ABC (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:36 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/article/210106/2
/Principal-accused-of-sexual-harrassment-takes-leave.
9. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 704 (quoting Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d
360, 363 (Cal. 1970)).
10. 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989).
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gives to these types of crimes makes them seem more prevalent than
the national statistics indicate.11 Furthermore, the court’s expansion
of liability leaves school districts without necessary safeguards,
which may hinder their ability to provide students with well-rounded
educations. Finally, had the court used language more similar to the
New York Court of Appeals in Mirand v. City of New York,12 the
decision would have protected students without placing additional
unnecessary burdens on school districts. Part V concludes that the
standard established by the court is overly broad to a fault and has
stripped public school districts of the protection they were previously
afforded.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While C.A. was a high school student in the William S. Hart
Union School District, his school directed him to see Hubbell for
counseling.13 Hubbell claimed that she wanted to help C.A. improve
his grades.14 Under the guise of accomplishing this goal, she began
spending time with him on and off school premises and driving him
home from school each day.15 The fourteen-year-old student alleged
that during this time Hubbell had sexually abused him by performing
fellatio on him, requiring him to perform cunnilingus on her, and
forcing him to have sexual intercourse with her, among other
things.16 The abuse continued from approximately January 2007
through September 2007.17 As a result of Hubbell’s inappropriate
conduct, C.A. suffered emotional distress, nervousness, anxiety, and
fear.18
In July 2008, Hubbell pleaded not guilty to a misdemeanor
charge of one count of annoying or molesting a child under the age
of eighteen.19 Hubbell originally had faced a felony charge for child
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. 637 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994).
13. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702.
14. Id.; Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe, supra note 4, at *4.
15. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702.
16. Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe, supra note 4, at *5–6.
17. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702.
18. Id.
19. Sharon Cotal, No Felony for Ex-Counselor: Charges Reduced for Former Golden Valley
Employee, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL (Sept. 3, 2008, 5:03 AM), http://www.signalscv
.com/archives/2693/.
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endangerment and contributing to the delinquency of a minor due to
C.A.’s and a second student’s allegations against her,20 but the
charges were reduced based on the available evidence.21 The court
ultimately required Hubbell to register as a sex offender and
sentenced her to three years of probation and thirty days of
community service.22
In January 2009, C.A. sued Hubbell and the District.23 The
District subsequently filed a demurrer to the complaint24 in which it
argued in part that C.A.’s causes of action for negligent supervision,
hiring, and retention failed to provide statutory authority for holding
a public entity liable.25 Additionally, the District claimed that
allegations of negligent hiring and supervision did not apply to a
public entity.26
On June 4, 2009, the trial court sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the action as to the District without leave to amend.27 In a
divided decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s
holding.28 The majority held that C.A.’s claims of liability for
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention were not viable because
C.A. failed to prove that the District had breached a statutorily
imposed duty.29
In February 2011, the California Supreme Court granted review
and ultimately overruled the court of appeal’s decision.30 It held that
public school districts can incur vicarious liability for the negligence
of any administrator or supervisor who knew or should have known
that the employee he or she hired and retained had a propensity for
sexual misconduct.31
20. Id.; Cotal & Holt, supra note 1.
21. Cotal, supra note 19.
22. Charles, supra note 2.
23. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 283, 286 (Ct. App.
2010). The causes of action included: (1) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (2)
negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; (3) constructive fraud; (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (5) sexual battery; (6) assault; (7) sexual harassment; (8) gender violence; and
(9) unfair business practices. Id. at 287.
24. Id. at 287.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 703 (Cal. 2012).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 702.
31. Id. at 711.
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III. REASONING OF THE COURTS
Both the court of appeal and the California Supreme Court heard
C.A.’s case.32 The court of appeal’s decision relied heavily on
traditional application of California law, which does not hold a
public entity liable without a statutory basis.33 The court also utilized
case precedent, which applied the theory of respondeat superior to
immunize public entities from liability if the employee’s act occurred
outside the scope of his or her employment.34 The California
Supreme Court overturned the court of appeal’s decision and other
case precedent to establish a new form of liability for public school
districts.35 Subpart A provides the court of appeal’s traditional
reasoning for affirming the trial court’s decision to sustain the school
district’s demurrer. Subpart B discusses the California Supreme
Court’s logic in reaching its unanimous holding, which overruled the
court of appeal’s decision and radically departed from conventional
case law.36 The California Supreme Court’s decision established that
a public school district may be liable for negligently hiring and
supervising an employee who it knew or should have known had a
propensity for sexual misconduct with students.37 Ultimately, this
new standard increases the potential liability for California public
school districts from the prior narrow standard of liability based on
respondeat superior.38
A. The Court of Appeal’s Traditional Opinion
The court of appeal applied the general rule that a public entity
employer may only be vicariously liable for torts its employees
committed within the scope of their employment.39 Since C.A. failed
to show how Hubbell’s sexual misconduct had fallen within the
32. Id. at 701–03.
33. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 291 (Ct. App.
2010).
34. Id. at 288.
35. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 711.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11.
38. Compare id. (holding that public school districts may be subject to vicarious liability for
the negligence of their administrative employees resulting in sexual injuries of students), with
John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 953–57 (Cal. 1989) (holding that public
school districts are immune from vicarious liability for the sexual misconduct of their
employees).
39. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288.
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scope of her employment, the court held that the District could not be
vicariously liable for Hubbell’s actions.40
In addressing the causes of action for negligent supervision,
hiring, and retention, the court held that the District could not be
vicariously liable because C.A. had failed to assert a statutory basis
for its liability.41 In California, a statutory basis is required for a
plaintiff to assign tort liability to a public entity, such as a school
district.42 The court further found that no mandatory duty existed that
required school districts to protect students from sexual harassment
or abuse.43 Although the court recognized the existence of a special
relationship between a school district and its students, it noted that
the existence of this relationship did not create a mandatory duty to
act absent a statutory basis for liability.44
The court of appeal treated this case as a straightforward
application of established case precedent and California law.
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court created a new and
ambiguous approach when it overruled the court of appeal’s
decision.
B. The California Supreme Court’s New Approach
The California Supreme Court began its decision by finding a
statutory basis where none previously had existed and by creating a
more stringent mandatory duty arising out of a special relationship.45
These two factors allowed the court to determine that a public school
district may be liable for negligent hiring and supervision of its
administrative and supervisory employees who knew or should have
known of an employee’s sexual proclivities toward students.46
Consequently, the court created a wider basis for liability for public
40. Id. at 289. This included the causes of action for sexual battery, assault, sexual
harassment, gender violence, constructive fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Both California Government Code sections 815(a) and 815.6 indicate the necessity of
an authorizing statute. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815(a) (2012 West) (“Except as otherwise
provided by statute . . . a public entity is not liable for an injury.”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.6
(2012 West) (providing that a public entity may be found liable when it is under a mandatory
duty imposed by an “enactment,” which serves the purpose of protecting against a specific risk).
43. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 291.
44. Id.
45. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 703, 704–05 (Cal. 2012).
46. See id. at 703, 704–05, 711.
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school districts.47
1. Statutory Framework
While the court of appeal reasoned that C.A. had failed to
provide statutory authority for his causes of action for negligent
hiring, supervision, or retention, the California Supreme Court easily
concluded that such a statutory basis existed.48 The California
Supreme Court relied on California Government Code section 815.2,
which states, in part, that a public entity may be liable for injuries
proximately caused by an employee’s act that falls within the scope
of his or her employment.49 Section 815.2(a) codifies the concept of
vicarious liability.50 The court’s reliance on this statute, therefore,
precluded an application of direct liability in this case. The court
used the respondeat superior framework of section 815.2 and its
interpretation of the standard of care imposed on school employees
to establish that a public school district may be vicariously liable for
injuries caused by negligent behavior, such as ineffective
supervision.51 However, the court recognized that the requirements
of causation and duty would limit this potential liability.52
2. Existence of a Special Relationship
After establishing a statutory basis for liability, the court
confronted the issue of whether a special relationship exists in order
to impose a heightened duty of care on public school districts.53 The
court noted that California law requires school districts and their
employees to supervise students’ conduct while on school grounds
47. See Answer to Petition for Review, William S. Hart, 270 P.3d 699 (No. S188982) 2011
CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 182, at *3–4, *9–10 (reasoning that the law was well established to
preclude liability and that were the court to hold for the petitioner it would “unsettle established
law and statutory norms”).
48. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 703.
49. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.2(a) (2012 West).
50. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009) (“[L]iability that a supervisory
party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as
an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.”), with CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 815.2(a) (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would,
apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal
representative.”).
51. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 708–09.
52. Id. at 709–10.
53. Id. at 704–05.
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and to enforce regulations necessary for students’ protection.54 This
general duty subjects school personnel to a uniform standard of care,
which compels them to act as reasonable persons would under the
same or similar circumstances.55
Since students are required to attend school and school
personnel have power over students on school premises, the court
concluded that a special relationship exists among the school district,
the district’s employees, and the students.56 This special relationship
imposes a heightened standard of care on school personnel, such as a
duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable
injury caused by a third party.57 The court’s reasoning directly
conflicted with the court of appeal’s decision, which opined that the
special relationship between a school district and its students did not
create mandatory duties.58
The California Supreme Court used the presence of a special
relationship to expand a public school district’s potential liability.59
However, the court intended this factor to help guard against liability
for other public entities in which no special relationship exists.60 The
court provided additional limitations in its discussion of causation
and duty.
3. The Limiting Role of Causation and Duty
The court restricted the scope and effect of its holding through
the required negligence elements of causation and duty.61 For
example, the court proposed that proving causation might be difficult
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 291 (Ct. App.
2010) (citing Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 727 (Ct.
App. 2005)).
59. Compare William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 704–05 (reasoning that the special relationship
imposes additional obligations on a school district beyond what is generally owed by other public
entities or individuals), with C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
291(reasoning that the special relationship does not, by itself, create liability).
60. One such case where no special relationship exists is de Villers v. County of San Diego,
67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 258 (Ct. App. 2007), where the plaintiff filed a claim of public liability for
the murder of the husband of a coroner’s office employee. In that case, the court held that the
county was not vicariously liable for the employee’s homicidal acts, in part because no special
relationship existed between the employee’s supervisors and coworkers, and the victim. Id. at
260–61.
61. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 709–10.
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when an individual defendant did not have authority over the entity’s
hiring or firing practices.62 This limitation might affect the outcome
of C.A.’s remanded case.63
On remand, C.A. will need to establish that a District
employee’s recommendation to hire Hubbell or failure to recommend
that the District fire Hubbell was a substantial factor in causing the
District to hire and retain Hubbell.64 This may be difficult given the
hiring and firing practices within the District.65
The hiring and termination of the District’s employees is the
responsibility of a governing board rather than of individual
administrators.66 For the school to fire an employee, the governing
board and a commission on professional competence are required to
take action.67 Although administrators and supervisors may
recommend that an individual be hired or fired, the effect that these
actions would have on the governing board’s ultimate decision is
unclear.68 Therefore, it is possible that the court of appeal will not
view the District’s hiring and firing procedures as a substantial cause
of C.A.’s sexual abuse. If C.A. cannot establish the causation
element of his negligence action, the court will not be able to find the
District liable.69 The California Supreme Court treated the causation
element as an important limitation on its decision for future litigation
against public entities.70
The court also focused on the duty element of a negligence
analysis by evaluating when a special relationship will give rise to a
duty to take, or abstain from taking, a particular course of action.71
The court noted that a public entity’s duty to an individual is
implicated by a factual assessment of whether the resulting injury

62. Id. at 709.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 705–06.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 705.
68. Id. at 705–06.
69. Id. at 709. The court noted that, while the school principal’s recommendations to the
governing board might carry significant weight, recommendations made by other District
employees would not be as influential. Id. Consequently, an individual District employee who is
not responsible for hiring or retention decisions would not be subjected to individual liability. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 709–10.
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was foreseeable.72 The court reasoned that little or no blame could be
attributed to a person or entity’s action or inaction if that defendant
did not know or should not have known of the danger a victim
faced.73 The court left open for future interpretation what would
constitute inappropriate action or inaction that would lead a student
to suffer a foreseeable injury.74
Despite these limitations, the court’s new public-entity standard
of liability places an additional burden on school districts to closely
monitor their administrators’ and supervisors’ actions.75 Such
liability is only somewhat curtailed by the characteristic limitations
of a negligence action.76 As a result of this new law, the court
remanded the case to the court of appeal to determine if the District
was vicariously liable for C.A.’s injuries.77 Consequently, although a
new standard has been set, it remains unclear how the court’s
decision will affect C.A.
IV. ANALYSIS
The court carefully noted that its William S. Hart decision
continues the California practice established in John R. of
immunizing public school districts from vicarious liability for its
employees’ intentional sexual misconduct.78 Yet, the court’s focus on
negligent hiring, supervising, and retaining still deviated from
California’s twenty-year practice of protecting public school districts
from liability arising out of sexual harassment suits. The following
analysis proposes that the court’s approach in William S. Hart
incorrectly expanded public school districts’ potential liability from
the John R. standard. In so doing, the court left public school districts
unprotected and ignored more practical options for creating a
sufficiently specific standard of care.

72. Id. at 710.
73. Id.
74. See id. (including only one example that “it is not generally foreseeable . . . that a hiring
recommendation made by an employee outside an organization’s circles of authority and
influence will cause harm to a third party” but not referencing any specific examples of what
would constitute foreseeable injury caused by types of action or inaction).
75. Id. at 711 (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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A. Saying Good-Bye to the John R. Safety Net
The California Supreme Court decided John R. in 1989.79 Since
then, it has been binding case precedent for claims of public school
districts’ vicarious liability for sexual harassment or abuse of
students committed by a district employee.80 In John R., the
California Supreme Court established that the doctrine of respondeat
superior did not apply to public school districts for sexual harassment
claims.81 The court premised its holding on the understanding that
teachers’ sexual misconduct did not arise out of their “job-created
authority” over students.82 Consequently, the John R. court found
that sexual misconduct falls outside the scope of teachers’
employment.83 The court reasoned that imposing liability on public
school districts in this context would result in an “unacceptable risk
that school districts would be dissuaded from permitting teachers to
interact with their students on any but the most formal and
supervised basis.”84
In William S. Hart, the court did not overrule John R., but rather
created a wider basis for liability. In John R., the court narrowly
focused on public school districts’ vicarious liability for sexual abuse
committed by teachers.85 In comparison, the William S. Hart court
focused more broadly on school districts’ potential liability for the
negligent supervision of all administrative or supervisory school
district employees.86 This change in approach indicates that a societal
shift has occurred since the John R. decision, mainly as a result of
increased media attention.87
79. John R., 769 P.2d 948.
80. John R. was a ninth-grade student when his mathematics teacher sexually abused him.
Id. at 949. John R.’s parents sued the mathematics teacher and the school district, alleging that the
district was liable for the teacher’s acts and its own negligence. Id. at 950.
81. Id. at 956–57.
82. Id. at 954–55.
83. Id. at 956–57.
84. Id. at 957.
85. Id. at 949 (“The principal question before us is whether the school district that employed
the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher's acts [of sexual misconduct] under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.”).
86. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 701–02 (Cal. 2012) (“On
review, the question presented is whether the District may be found vicariously liable for the acts
of its employees . . . not for the acts of the counselor, which were outside the scope of her
employment . . . but for the negligence of supervisory or administrative personnel.”).
87. The Internet’s growing prevalence has undoubtedly assisted in the constant publication
of issues, such as sexual harassment in schools, in a way that was not feasible in the 1980s. For
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B. The Media Focus on Sexual Harassment
and the Resulting Misperception
California courts have long held that public school districts
cannot adequately educate students without also ensuring the
students’ physical and mental well-being.88 This safeguarding of
students previously included a reciprocal protection of public school
districts from liability.89 When the John R. court made school
districts immune from vicarious liability for sexual harassment
committed by teachers, it also emphasized the necessity of providing
a healthy learning environment, which included extracurricular and
one-on-one contact between students and teachers.90 The William S.
Hart court’s expansion of liability introduced an all-encompassing
protection of students from sexual predators, even at the expense of
losing a well-rounded educational environment.91
One could assume that the court widened the basis of liability
for public school districts because of a need to quash the prevalence
of educator sexual misconduct toward students. However, no such
prevalence exists.92 In fact, a national survey published by the
American Association of University Women Educational Foundation
(AAUW) showed that the number of incidents of teachers and other
school employees sexually harassing students decreased from 44
percent in 1993 to 38 percent in 2001.93 Other statistics indicate that
sexual abuse of children in general has continued to decline on a
national level.94 According to sexual abuse experts, all cases of child
sexual abuse fell by more than 60 percent between 1992 and 2010.95
example, within four days of its release of the results of the American Association of University
Women Educational Foundation (AAUW) study, approximately 1,200 articles were published
nationwide regarding it. Jo Turner, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School, AAUW
CALIFORNIA ONLINE BRANCH (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.aauwcaonline.org/2011/11/crossing
-the-line-sexual-harassment-at-school/.
88. Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 694 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing In
re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1294–95 (Cal. 1985)).
89. See John R., 769 P.2d at 956 (reasoning that, under the theory of respondeat superior,
school districts are protected from liability for a teacher’s actions).
90. Id.
91. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11.
92. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING,
TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 14 (2001).
93. Id.
94. Erica Goode, Researchers See Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Rate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2012, at A13.
95. Id.
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These statistics starkly contrast with the picture that the
California media paints of sexual harassment and abuse of minors at
the hands of educators. From 2012 to 2013, print, broadcast, and
Internet news outlets have paraded a continuous flow of sexual
harassment cases brought against California teachers and school
personnel.96 When publications recount the sexual misconduct of one
teacher, such as a Los Angeles Unified School District elementary
school teacher who molested thirteen former students, there is
understandable public concern.97 This heinous crime begins to look
like a pattern when viewed alongside the four Chino Valley Unified
School District teachers who allegedly engaged in illicit sexual
relations with students.98 Concern could easily turn to outrage when
one learns about the Los Angeles Unified School District secondgrade teacher who allegedly molested twenty-three students over a
five-year period.99 The events underlying each of these criminal
actions resulted in separate lawsuits that were memorialized in news
stories within one month. This media coverage may have influenced
the California courts to take action to quash what appears to be
rampant sexual abuse.
However, action had already been taken: California’s legislation
passed the Child Abuse and Neglect Report Act (“the Act”) in 1980.
The Act’s purpose is to protect children from sexual abuse,100
defined as sexual assault, lewd or lascivious acts, and sexual
exploitation.101 Under the Act, teachers, administrators, counselors,
and other school employees are mandated reporters who have a duty
to report reasonable suspicion of child abuse.102 If a mandated
reporter fails to report a reasonably suspicious incident, he or she
96. See Ex-LA Teacher Will Stand Trial on Molest Charges, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/sep/28/ex-la-teacher-will-stand-trial-on
-molest-charges/?print&page=all; Sandra Emerson, Chino Valley Unified Reveals 4 Teachers
Had Sex with Students, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.contracostatimes.com
/california/ci_21462239/cvusd-reveals-4-teachers-had-sex-students; Jason Kandel, Telfair
Elementary Teacher Sentenced in Sex Abuse Case, NBCLA, (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Telfair-Elementary-Teacher-Sentenced-Sex-AbuseCase-170565876.html.
97. Kandel, supra note 96.
98. Emerson, supra note 96.
99. Ex-LA Teacher Will Stand Trial on Molest Charges, supra note 96.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164 (2001 West).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (2001 West).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (2001 West).
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may be subject to criminal liability and fines.103 Consequently,
California holds the administrators and supervisors who oversee
hiring, firing, and retaining teachers responsible for reasonably
suspicious acts of teachers’ sexual misconduct with students.
Furthermore, the educators participating in the illicit acts
continue to face criminal charges, which, if proven, would prevent
them from teaching in the future. The criminal system may be
flawed, as can be seen by the light sentence that Hubbell received for
her crimes against C.A. and another student.104 However, Hubbell’s
sentence is not necessarily indicative of a trend of lenient
punishments. For example, the Los Angeles Superior Court
sentenced Paul Chapel III to twenty-five years in prison and ordered
him to register as a sex offender for life for his crimes of molesting
thirteen former students.105 Although the range of punishments may
indicate a judicial downfall, the individuals responsible for sexual
harassment and those who directly supervise them are already being
held liable. The next logical step was not to place a heightened
burden of additional liability on school districts to compensate for
other judicial downfalls.
C. The Lack of Safeguard for Our Schools
School districts must provide students with safe environments in
which to learn. However, the courts should also provide certain
safeguards to public school districts so that they can accomplish this
task effectively and without additional liability burdens.106 The
vague “knew or should have known” standard that the William S.
Hart court implemented is a significant roadblock to protection of
school districts.107 Ultimately, the lack of safeguards afforded to
103. Id. § 11166(c) (2001 West).
104. Charles, supra note 2.
105. Kandel, supra note 96.
106. John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989). The court
reasoned that holding public school districts vicariously liable would “deter districts from
encouraging, or even authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one contacts between teachers
and students or . . . induce districts to impose such rigorous controls on activities of this nature
that the educational process would be negatively affected.” Id.
107. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 711 (Cal. 2012) The
William S. Hart court noted that the John R. court’s concern for maintaining an environment of a
well-rounded educational experience is outweighed by the need to hold “school districts to the
exercise of due care in their administrators’ and supervisors’ selection of . . . employees and the
close monitoring of their conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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public school districts could negatively impact the quality of
education and resources available to students.108
The court acknowledged that its decision could lead to
undesirable consequences in schools,109 including deterring public
school districts from “encouraging, or even authorizing,
extracurricular and . . . one-on-one contacts between teachers and
students.”110 Yet, the court felt that these educational elements could
be sacrificed to achieve the greater purpose of holding public school
districts liable for their administrators’ negligence.111 The court’s
disregard for extracurricular activities is disconcerting given the
value of these programs. These types of activities are considered a
strong deterrent to students’ drug use and abuse,112 an aid in
improving foster children’s academic performance,113 and an
incentive for student athletes to do well in school.114 As such, when
courts determined educational quality in the past, they examined
extracurricular activities as well as educational and sports facilities,
class sizes, and other factors.115 Consequently, the court’s dismissal
of extracurricular activities and one-on-one contact with students
may be directly linked to California educators’ ability or lack thereof
to provide their students with a quality education.116
While the true extent of the decision’s impact remains to be
seen, it is likely that the cost of defending similar future claims will

108. Maura Dolan, Student Lawsuits Against Schools Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at
AA3 (including comments by Robert A. Olson, an attorney for the William S. Hart School
District, who noted that this ruling would “entangle individual administrators in litigation,
regardless of whether allegations were true,” which will inevitably affect teachers’ and the
districts’ ability to provide quality education to students).
109. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11.
110. Id. at 711.
111. Id.
112. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citation
omitted) (“Nationwide, students who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less
likely to develop substance abuse problems than are their less-involved peers.”).
113. Stephanie Klitsch, Beyond the Basics: How Extracurricular Activities Can Benefit
Foster Youth, NAT’L CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://
www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2010/oct_dec_2010/beyond_the_basics_how_extracurricular
_activities_can_benefit_foster_youth/.
114. Abel Vargas, Choices: To Play Sports or Not to Play Sports, MODESTO BEE
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.modbee.com/2013/01/01/2515885/choices-to-play-sports-or-not.html.
115. Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guarantees
of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2011 (1996).
116. Dolan, supra note 108.
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be exorbitant.117 The funds that may be spent defending these
lawsuits might otherwise be allocated to resources and programs for
students. Additionally, public school districts may now be denied
insurance coverage if an employee knew or should have known
about a teacher’s illicit conduct and failed to report it, which would
further increase the financial burden of litigation for the school
district.118
The vague “knew or should have known” William S. Hart
standard puts every school employee on notice, from the janitor to
the superintendent, of his or her duty to report even the most
minimally suspicious activity, which makes it imperative for school
districts to train all employees on sexual harassment and reporting
procedures.119 California already requires employers with fifty or
more employees, including public school districts, to provide a
minimum of two hours of sexual harassment training every two
years.120 However, this training is only intended to “provide a
minimum threshold” and need not be specifically directed toward the
types of sexual misconduct that occur between school employees and
students.121 For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District
provides ample information to teachers and administrators regarding
reporting policies.122 Unfortunately, the information available
117. Although costs of litigation are difficult to determine because of the role of insurance
policies, the Berkeley Unified School District recently revealed that it spent $172,697.15
defending a sexual harassment lawsuit brought by a high school student against a district
guidance counselor. Anika Anand, Berkeley Unified Reveals Spending on Sexual Harassment
Case, CAL. WATCH (Jan. 3, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/berkeley
-unified-reveals-spending-sexual-harassment-case-17365. Of this total, the school paid
$46,281.25. Id.
118. Patricia S. Eyres, California School Districts Liable for Sexual Harassment of Students
by Administrative Employees, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Mar. 17, 2012), http://
www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/index.php/site/article/california-school-districts-liable-for
-sexual-harassment-of-students-by-adm#axzz27bcFqXlh; Don Jergler, Vicarious Liability Ruling
May Impact Education Insureds in California, INS.J. (Mar. 14, 2012), http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2012/03/14/239526.htm.
119. Jergler, supra note 118.
120. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1 (2013 West).
121. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(f) (2013 West); Karen J. Krogman, Comment, Protecting
Our Children: Reforming Statutory Provisions to Address Reporting, Investigating, and
Disclosing Sexual Abuse in Public Schools, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1605, 1623 (2011) (noting
that while some states do require mandatory training sessions to educate teachers about detecting
child abuse, these training sessions are generally not geared toward child abuse in public schools
but rather abuse from outside sources).
122. MICHELLE KING & DAVID HOLMQUIST, L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BUL-5736.2,
EMPLOYEE-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL ABUSE AND RELATED INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION
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regarding recognizing signs of sexual harassment is limited to the
California Education Code’s definitions of what sexual harassment
may entail.123 Therefore, even with training, it will be difficult to
determine what falls within the “should have known” category until
more people bring lawsuits against school districts. Given the
ambiguity of this standard, it is likely that California courts will see
an increase in cases going to trial instead of settling because of this
question of fact. This will place an increased litigation burden not
only on school districts but also on the already overburdened court
system.
D. How the Court Could Have Avoided Ambiguity
If the California Supreme Court had used language similar to
that used by the New York Court of Appeals in Mirand v. City of
New York,124 much of the William S. Hart decision’s ambiguity could
have been avoided. In Mirand, the Court of Appeals held a New
York public school district liable for negligent supervision.125 In
doing so, the court determined that for a public school district to
breach its duty to supervise, the plaintiff must establish that school
authorities had “sufficiently specific knowledge or notice” of the
conduct that caused the injury.126 Such specific knowledge could
only be obtained if the school district had notice of prior similar
conduct.127 Without such notice, the court proposed that school
personnel could not reasonably guard against certain acts on school
property.128 The New York courts have consistently looked for
evidence of prior misconduct to determine if a school district is liable
for negligent supervision.129 Because of the specificity in the New
York standard, it more appropriately protects school districts from
POLICY (2012).
123. L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY (2010).
124. 637 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994).
125. Id. at 267. Two students sued the board of education for negligent supervision for
injuries sustained during an altercation with other students. Id. at 264–65.
126. Id. at 266.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Wilber v. Binghamton, 66 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (App. Div. 1946) (reasoning that there
was no evidence that anything occurred prior to the alleged incident to suggest that action should
have been taken to avoid the accident); see also Doe v. Fulton Sch. Dist., 826 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544
(App. Div. 2006) (“District[] . . . [failed] to provide adequate supervision in the locker room, even
in the absence of notice of a prior sexual assault.”).
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liability than California’s vague “knew or should have known”
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court’s William S. Hart decision
inappropriately expanded liability for public school districts.130 The
court may have felt its decision was necessary given the media’s
skewed representation of sexual harassment and abuse as an
epidemic rapidly spreading through California’s schools.131
However, the court could have easily rendered a decision that
provided protection for California students and maintained
safeguards from liability for public school districts. The court’s
overly broad language might now lead to increased litigation and
associated litigation costs for public school districts. This additional
financial burden, and the court’s disregard for school districts’ ability
to provide extracurricular activities and other components of a wellrounded education, could result in a decline in the quality of
education and resources available to students. Despite the potential
downfalls of this decision, it is still unclear the effect it will have on
C.A. and the William S. Hart Union School District.

130. Dolan, supra note 108.
131. See supra Part IV.B.

